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TEACHING TORTS THROUGH EXERCISES ON DRAFTING 
VERDICT FORMS 
ROBERT E. KEETON* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
I am grateful for the opportunity to contribute to this Law Journal issue on 
“Teaching Torts.”  It is a welcomed break from the combination of judicial 
challenges and judicial routines that are my regular fare as a federal trial judge.  
I count myself as especially privileged to be a trial judge, but I also 
occasionally enjoy an escape to a more academic undertaking. 
The subject I have selected is Teaching Torts Through Exercises on 
Drafting Verdict Forms.  The verdict form I propose for an illustrative exercise 
is the kind that I commonly ask trial lawyers who appear before me to help me 
prepare for use in trials of cases involving federal law claims.  Cases in this 
area have become increasingly complex over the last two decades because of 
changes in the governing statutes and precedents.  Rapid change is inevitably 
accompanied by new complications and unsettled issues that trial lawyers and 
trial judges must explore before they reach appellate courts.  Learning what is 
settled and what remains unsettled is hard work.  Trying to draft a good verdict 
form for a case involving unsettled issues of law is a great learning experience 
for everyone who participates. 
II.  AN ILLUSTRATIVE EXERCISE 
Consider, for illustrative purposes, a case in which the plaintiff is a female 
employee of a nationwide entity that markets a shopping service for disabled 
persons who would have to depend on relatives, neighbors or other friends to 
do regular shopping for groceries, drugs and routine clothing purchases absent 
such a shopping service as the defendant employer entity offers. 
One of the counts of the plaintiff’s complaint alleges gender discrimination 
grounded in the notion that plaintiff was promoted into the lowest rank of 
company executive responsibility three years before her federal lawsuit was 
filed, and, since that promotion has experienced gender discrimination, she 
attributes in part to company policies and practices that favor males over 
females otherwise similarly situated. 
 
* United States District Judge for the District of Massachusetts. 
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One of the unsettled issues of law presented by this count of plaintiff’s 
case, and company defenses to this count, is whether the standard of 
adjudication is subjective (that is, based on the state of mind of the company 
actor whose decision to lay off plaintiff is challenged by plaintiff in this 
lawsuit) or objective (that is, based on whether the decision to lay off plaintiff 
is beyond the range of what a reasonably competent executive in the position 
of that actor, at the time of the conduct that is challenged, must have chosen). 
III.  A KEY CHARACTERISTIC OF RELEVANT LAW 
When, as trial lawyer or trial judge, one begins to consider the background 
of statutory provisions, administrative regulations and judicial opinions that 
may be invoked as sources of authority bearing upon issues presented by a 
claim like plaintiff’s, met by defenses like those asserted by the defendant 
entity and the individual executive (male or female—who made the decision to 
lay off plaintiff rather than laying off some other executive or lower-level 
employee to whom responsibilities like those plaintiff had been performing 
might be assigned), a problem becomes apparent immediately.  It is impossible 
to know what the relevant law will turn out to be.  Existing sources of authority 
leave that question in doubt.  The best one can do is make a prediction about 
how it will be resolved by a trial or appellate court in a particular case if the 
case is not settled before that decision is made. 
IV.  A DRAFTING EXERCISE FOR APPROACHING THE 
PROBLEM OF UNSETTLED LAW 
A drafting exercise in which potential learners are given drafting 
assignments works best if the instructor identifies for each student a role that 
student is to occupy.  Is the student a trial lawyer representing the plaintiff?  Or 
an associate in that lawyer’s firm, assigned to assist the trial lawyer?  Or a trial 
lawyer representing the individual executive who made the lay-off decision?  
Or an associate assigned to assist that trial lawyer?  Or a trial judge?  Or a law 
clerk to the trial judge? 
V.  MORE ABOUT RELEVANT FACTS AND LAW 
For this exercise, we assume as an added background fact that plaintiff 
received less in termination benefits than two male employees, similarly 
situated in all respects, who were laid off near the time plaintiff was laid off. 
Plaintiff argues that under applicable law these adverse employment 
decisions violate not only state anti-discrimination law (statutory, 
administrative and judicial in origin) but also Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964.1  Title VII provides: 
 
 1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-e17 (1994 & Supp. IV). 
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It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—(1) . . . to 
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual 
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin. . . .2 
Assume, for the purposes of this exercise, that the trial judge denied a 
motion to dismiss on the pleadings in this case, and in a Memorandum gave the 
following explanation: 
  Plaintiff has adequately alleged a prima facie showing of disparate 
treatment sex discrimination with regard to her termination benefits.  She 
alleges that similarly situated male employees have received severance 
payments far in excess of those that she received.  When considering the facts 
as alleged in plaintiff’s complaint as true, as I must in this challenge to the 
adequacy of her pleadings, I conclude that she has adequately alleged a prima 
facie case with regard to her adverse-treatment claim by alleging that: (1) she 
is a member of a protected class; (2) she was performing her job at a level that 
met her employer’s legitimate expectations; (3) she was terminated; and (4) 
upon termination she was not offered a severance package equal to those 
severance packages offered to similarly positioned male employees whose 
employment has also been terminated.  See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824 (1973) (stating the prima facie 
case for a disparate treatment claim in the context of racial discrimination in 
job re-hiring as follows: (1) plaintiff is a member of a protected class; (2) 
plaintiff was subjected to adverse employment action; (3) plaintiff’s employer 
treated similarly situated non-black employees more favorably; and (4) 
plaintiff was qualified to do the job).  See also Lang v. Star Herald, 107 F.3d 
1308, 1311 (8th Cir. 1997) (stating the elements for a prima facie case of 
gender discrimination in the context of job benefits as follows: (1) that she 
belonged to a protected class; (2) that she was qualified to receive the benefit 
of an indefinite unpaid leave of absence with a guarantee of returning to her 
former position; (3) that she was denied the benefit; and (4) that the same 
benefit was available to others with similar qualifications); Lawton v. State 
Mut. Life Assurance Co. of America, 924 F. Supp. 331, 345 (D. Mass. 1996) 
(discussing elements of a prima facie case of gender discrimination in the 
context of severance packages).  Plaintiff’s complaint, therefore, survives 
defendant’s motion to dismiss. 
VI.  DIRECTIONS FOR THIS EXERCISE 
Assume that, for the first phase of this exercise, the person occupying the 
role of teacher has instructed each student to approach the first assignment in 
the role of an associate in the law firm of the trial lawyer representing the 
plaintiff.  The trial lawyer tells you that the trial judge has scheduled a case 
 
 2. Id. §2000e-2(a). 
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management conference for consideration of the precise drafting of questions 
to be included in a verdict form for submission of this case to the jury by 
special questions only, with no general verdict, under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 49.  He tells you also that the trial judge has delivered to the 
attorneys for all parties a proposed draft for questions on the subject identified 
above, in Part V.  That draft begins with a set of instructions to the jury, as 
follows: 
Claims of Gender Discrimination in Termination Pay Benefits 
  Instructions to Jurors: The court has ruled that on the record before us in 
this case it is beyond genuine dispute that one male executive, whose forty-
third birthday was in October 1998, and whose employment with the company 
began on January 1, 1978, was laid off effective at midnight December 31, 
1998, and was allowed termination pay benefits equal to salary for two years; 
that another male executive, whose forty-sixth birthday was in August 1998, 
and whose employment with the company began on January 1, 1976, was laid 
off effective at midnight December 31, 1998, and was allowed termination pay 
benefits equal to salary for thirty months; and that the plaintiff, whose forty-
fourth birthday was in August 1999, was laid off effective at midnight January 
31, 1999, and was allowed termination pay benefits equal to salary for eighteen 
months. 
The next segment of the trial judge’s draft contains alternative forms of 
Question 1(a).  The first form places the burden of persuasion on the plaintiff.  
The second form places the burden of persuasion on the defendant.  Should the 
trial judge submit both forms to the jury?  Or only one?  If only one, which 
one? 
FIRST FORM 
  1(a). Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that relevant 
circumstances existing on January 31, 1999, were so similar to those existing 
on December 31, 1998, that the defendant company had no objectively 
reasonable grounds for allowing the plaintiff only eighteen months of 
termination benefits though the company had allowed greater termination 
benefits to the male executives laid off effective December 31, 1998? 
_____YES  _____NO 
If YES to 1(a), proceed to 1(b).  Otherwise, skip to Question 2. 
 
SECOND FORM 
  1(a). Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that relevant 
circumstances existing on January 31, 1999, were so different from those 
existing on December 31, 1998, that defendant company had objectively 
reasonable grounds for allowing the plaintiff only eighteen months of 
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termination benefits after the company had allowed greater termination 
benefits to the male executives laid off effective December 31, 1998? 
_____YES  _____NO 
If NO to 1(a), proceed to 1(b).  Otherwise, skip to Question 2. 
  1(b). Did the company executive who chose to allow the plaintiff only 
eighteen months of termination benefits though the company had allowed 
greater termination benefits to the male executives laid off effective December 
31, 1998, have knowledge at the time he made the decision to award plaintiff 
only eighteen months of termination benefits that the male employees 
terminated effective December 31, 1998, had been allowed greater benefits? 
  (1)_____YES, we unanimously find by a preponderance of the evidence. 
  (2)_____NO, we unanimously find by a preponderance of the evidence. 
  (3)_____We find no preponderance of the evidence either way. 
If your answer to 1(b) is 1(b)(1) or 1(b)(3), proceed to 1(c).  Otherwise, skip to 
Question 2. 
 
  1(c) Did the company executive who chose to allow the plaintiff only 
eighteen months of termination benefits knowingly discriminate against the 
plaintiff on grounds of gender? 
  (1)_____YES, we unanimously find by a preponderance of the evidence. 
  (2)_____NO, we unanimously find by a preponderance of the evidence. 
  (3)_____We find no preponderance of the evidence either way. 
If your answer to 1(c) is 1(c)(1) or 1(c)(3), proceed to 1(d).  Otherwise, skip to 
Question 2. 
 
  1(d). Did the company executive who chose to allow the plaintiff only 
eighteen months of termination benefits discriminate against the plaintiff on 
gender grounds willfully and in the scope of employment for the company? 
 
(A) Willfully 
  _____YES _____NO 
(B) In the scope of employment for the company 
  _____YES _____NO 
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VII.  TAKING THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE PLAINTIFF’S 
TRIAL LAWYER AND HIS ASSISTANT 
A. Introduction 
Put yourself in the role of student.  The trial lawyer you are assisting asks 
you to prepare for him your recommendation, and reasons for it, about the 
choice between the FIRST FORM and SECOND FORM of Question 1(a).  
Also, he asks you to draft and explain any proposed modification of any of 
Questions 1(a) through 1(d) that you would propose to modify. 
Note that the answer form for Questions 1(b) and 1(c) gives the jury a 
three-part choice rather than simply YES or NO.  By using the three-part form, 
the trial judge learns whether the jury’s answer will be decisive of outcome 
regardless of where the law (as finally determined, even though now unsettled) 
places the burden of persuasion.  That is, if the jury makes a finding 
“unanimously by a preponderance of the evidence,” the unsettled legal issue 
about where the law places the burden of persuasion does not have to be 
decided in this case.  Only if the jury answers that they “find no preponderance 
of the evidence either way” will it be necessary to decide that unsettled legal 
issue. 
Could Question 1(a) be modified to use the three-part answer form?  To 
say the least, trying to do so in a way that is crisp and clear will be difficult.  
Here is a possibility that I believe to be clear, but not crisp: 
 
  1(a) Were the relevant circumstances existing on January 31, 1999: (1) so 
similar to those existing on December 31, 1998, that the defendant company 
had no objectively reasonable grounds for allowing the plaintiff only eighteen 
months of termination benefits though the company had allowed greater 
termination benefits to the male executives laid off effective December 31, 
1998, or (2) so different from those existing on December 31, 1998, that the 
defendant company had objectively reasonable grounds for allowing the 
plaintiff only eighteen months of termination benefits after the company had 
allowed greater termination benefits to the male executives laid off effective 
December 31, 1998, or (3) so unproved by the evidence before you in this case 
that you unanimously find no preponderance of the evidence for either (1) or 
(2)? 
 (1)_____We unanimously find by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) 
is proved. 
 (2)_____We unanimously find by a preponderance of the evidence that (2) 
is proved. 
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 (3)_____We unanimously find no preponderance of the evidence either 
way. 
This is a draft somewhat edited to improve upon my first draft, but in my 
view not the best that can be done.  Students might be encouraged to propose 
improvements. 
B. A Blend of Substantive Law and Drafting Issues 
Taking the perspective of the plaintiff’s trial lawyer and his assistant, what 
things about the substantive content and the drafting of any of the alternative 
forms of the trial judge’s proposed two FORMS of Question 1(a) should we 
consider? 
The FIRST FORM of Question 1(a) places the burden of persuasion on the 
party who wishes to show that relevant circumstances were “so similar . . . that 
the defendant company had no objectively reasonable grounds for allowing the 
plaintiff” less in termination benefits than the laid-off male executives 
received.  This, of course, is what we (representing the plaintiff) want the jury 
to find.  But do we also want to contend that under McDonnell Douglas Corp. 
v. Green3 and its progeny the trial judge’s first two questions to the jury should 
be about the first two elements in the order of the usual statement of the 
elements of a prima facie case, discussed in Part V, above?  In other words, 
unless the defendant will stipulate that these two elements are satisfied in this 
case, should the judge ask the jury the two questions stated here? 
 
  (1) Was plaintiff a member of a protected class? 
  (2) Was plaintiff subjected to adverse employment action? 
 
The drafting of other appropriate questions to be answered in order to 
complete a showing of a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas as 
adapted to our case, is more difficult.  For a third question, instead of asking if 
plaintiff was “denied the benefit,” as the Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit framed the question in Lang v. Star Herald,4 should we suggest (again, 
unless the defendant will stipulate) that the third question should identify what 
we contend was exactly what plaintiff received in termination benefits and ask 
the jury if they so find?  Then the final question to complete the showing of the 
prima facie case might be as follows: 
 
  (4) Did the male executives laid off effective December 31, 1998, receive 
greater termination benefits than those received by plaintiff? 
 
 3. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
 4. 107 F.3d 1308, 1311 (8th Cir. 1997). 
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We might consider proposing that these questions be followed by a fifth 
question as follows: 
 
  (5) Was defendant’s response to the burden shifted to it by the plaintiff’s 
showing of a prima facie case a pretext rather than an articulation of a reason 
for denying plaintiff equal benefits that was entirely gender neutral? 
 
If we pursue this course, we will still have to consider whether questions 
on the subject-matter content of the trial judge’s Question 1(a) must be asked.  
Is the standard for liability objective (“no objectively reasonable grounds for 
allowing the plaintiff” less, or some other framing of an objective standard)?  
Or is the standard subjective (“knowledge” of what the different benefits were, 
or “knowingly discriminate,” or “willfully”)?  Whether objective or subjective, 
does the standard also involve a scope of employment component?  I postpone 
discussion of these substantive-law issues to a later part of this article5 in order, 
first, to turn to more questions about placing burdens in the framing of special 
questions for the jury. 
C. More About Placing Burdens in the Framing of Questions 
When preparing special questions for use in a verdict form, a party must 
craft the precise questions of historical fact that the party asserts remain in 
genuine dispute and that would be material, as a matter of law, to the 
decisionmaker responsible for making the determination that all required 
elements for each of that party’s articulated theories of claim can be satisfied 
by jury findings supported by evidence.  Plaintiff will not be able to meet this 
burden by drafting questions that call for “black-box” or unexplained findings. 
I am not aware of any reported decision that addresses this pretext issue, 
suggested as Question (5) in Part B, immediately above, and the need for 
something better than a “black-box” question, in a context involving alleged 
discrimination on grounds of gender.  Perhaps it is easier to think about the 
possible need for something better than a “black-box” question in a context 
involving an alleged common-law deceit cause of action.  For example, the 
draft questions to support submission of a claim of common law deceit must 
refer to specific conduct or specific words spoken that directly or inferentially 
constitute the deceitful words or phrases and the time, place and circumstances 
in which those words or phrases were used, to support the trial-worthiness of 
the claim. 
Generalized questions that merely restate the words of a decisional or 
statutory prescription do not show that a triable issue of fact exists in the 
 
 5. See Parts VIII and IX, infra. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2001] TEACHING TORTS THROUGH EXERCISES 787 
particular case.  In order to show that a particular draft verdict question 
presents a trial-worthy issue, a party must, in that party’s supplemental 
submission in support of the court’s using that question in the verdict form, 
explain first, how the ultimate finding of historical fact framed in the proposed 
question would be material to a determination that each particular element of a 
particular theory of a claim or defense can be satisfied.  Second, the party must 
point to admissible evidence, proffered in the record before the court that could 
reasonably support an answer to the question, by the finder of fact, in that 
party’s favor. 
This point is further explained in the following excerpt: 
  When exceptional complexity or lack of clarity of issues is a barrier to 
framing issues clearly by more traditional methods, a court may appropriately 
require early (and, if needed, continuing) consultations with the aim of framing 
precisely the questions that will be submitted to the jury if the case goes to jury 
trial. 
  For example, when cross-motions for summary judgment have been filed, 
the court may deny each motion because of the movant’s failure to meet the 
movant’s burden under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules (or a similar state rule).  It 
may nevertheless be appropriate for the court, even after denying the cross-
motions, to set a schedule within which each party has an opportunity to file a 
new, better-focused motion if the party concludes it can surmount any 
obstacles to doing so by pressing for more precisely framed legal and factual 
theories.  One effective way of focusing contentions, so the trial judge may 
then consider whether any genuine dispute of material fact exists, is to 
consider how any fact questions might be framed for consideration by the 
finder of facts. 
  In any event, questions to be submitted to the jury must be framed 
precisely at some point before the case goes to the jury.  The trial judge and 
trial lawyers may well commence this task early, to aid as well the focusing of 
arguments on motions for summary judgment, on the appropriate scope of 
discovery, and on any other matter that depends on what the issues will be at 
trial. 
  An attorney who contends that a genuine dispute exists as to some material 
fact should be able to frame clearly a “written question[] susceptible of 
categorical or other brief answer,” proposed for use in a “special verdict.”  If, 
when challenged to do so, an attorney cannot state precisely any proposed 
question of fact that is disputed and material, summary judgment is almost 
certainly appropriate.  If, on the other hand, counsel can frame even a single 
disputed and material question of fact, summary judgment is inappropriate. 
  In some instances, the efforts of the trial lawyers and trial judge to frame 
disputed and material questions of fact for submission to a jury may reveal 
complexities that are obstacles to their efforts.  Obstacles may be especially 
serious when the independent complexity of legal and factual issues that are 
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relevant to claims or defenses is enhanced by complex relationships among the 
legal and factual issues. Relationship with public policy reasoning underlying 
the applicable legal rules may add still more obstacles to framing jury 
questions that are clear and correct.6 
VIII.  MORE ABOUT PRETEXT AND COMPLEXITY 
The complexity incident to unsettled law regarding pretextual explanation 
of grounds for a decision to terminate employment is greater than has been 
illustrated in Parts III through VII of this Essay.  One of the most interesting 
areas in which law regarding pretextual explanations is invoked involves cases 
in which the employee has asserted violations of the employee’s freedom of 
speech.  More about pretext and the complexity of law applicable in this 
context appears in Lynch v. City of Boston.7 
I have chosen here, however, to discuss only two sources of complexity. 
First, who has the burden of proof?  The First Form of Question 1(a) in 
Part VI, above, is crafted to place the burden on the plaintiff.  The Second 
Form of Question 1(a) is crafted to place the burden on the defendant.  The 
answer forms for Questions 1(b) and 1(c) are crafted to tell the jury explicitly 
to recite their unanimous finding that no party has proved its contention by a 
preponderance of the evidence, if that is their view.8  Second, does applicable 
law invoke a subjective standard of judgment or instead an objective 
standard?9 
IX.  MORE ABOUT SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE STANDARDS OF JUDGMENT 
As an instructor responsible for an exercise on achieving a better 
understanding of substantive law with respect to applicable standards of 
judgment, I propose some drafts that you might consider making available to 
students at some point along the way during the exercise, but not before they 
have made some first attempt to draft without this added guidance.  These draft 
questions might follow whatever set of subquestions you and your students 
have used in Question 1.  I present these as subparts of a proposed Question 2.  
Notice that even if the question uses terminology identical to that used 
somewhere for the questions appearing in subparts of Question 1, Part VI, 
 
 6. ROBERT E. KEETON, JUDGING IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM § 16.6.8 (1999) 
(footnotes omitted). 
 7. 989 F. Supp. 275 (D. Mass. 1997) (omitting appellate history not involving any ruling on 
appropriateness of the verdict form). 
 8. For a discussion of the use of this method of submission see KEETON, supra note 6, 
§20.2.2.  See also id. §§ 20.1.1, 20.1.2. 
 9. On this issue, more appears in the following sources: Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. 
Insurance Co. of North America, 928 F. Supp. 54, 60 (D. Mass. 1996); Foster v. McGrail, 844 F. 
Supp. 19-21, 22-23 (D. Mass. 1994).  Concerning subjective and objective standards of decisions 
also see KEETON, supra note 6, §§ 3.2-3.4. 
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above, a difference is that the “Instructions to Jurors” here sharpen the 
meaning of the subquestions by defining words and phrases used. 
 
Question 2 
Instructions to Jurors: As used throughout Question 2: 
  The phrase “objectively reasonable” means that you are to apply an 
“objective” standard of judgment of the conduct about which a subpart of 
Question 2 asks. 
  A question about acting “with knowledge,” or “knowingly,” or “willfully,” 
or “with reckless disregard,” means that you are to apply a “subjective” 
standard of judgment of the conduct about which a subpart of Question 2 asks.  
That is, you are to decide whether, in fact, the person whose conduct the 
subpart asks about did have the state of mind of “knowledge,” or “willfulness,” 
or “reckless disregard.”  It is not enough to show that YES is the proper answer 
that you believe an ordinarily prudent person would have had that state of 
mind.  The question is whether you find that the person whose conduct is 
asked about did, at the time of the conduct asked about, have that state of 
mind. 
  2(a)(1) Did the company executive who chose to allow the plaintiff only 
eighteen months of termination benefits know, at the time he made the 
decision to award her only eighteen months of benefits, that the two male 
employees terminated on December 31, 1998, had been allowed greater 
benefits? 
_____YES  _____NO 
If YES to 2(a)(1), proceed to 2(a)(2).  Otherwise, skip to 2(b).  
  2(a)(2) Applying the standard of “objectively reasonable,” was that 
decision of the company executive beyond the range of choices an executive in 
the position of that executive could make without violating the standard of 
“objectively reasonable” decisionmaking? 
_____YES  _____NO 
If YES to 2(a)(2), proceed to 2(a)(3).  Otherwise, skip to 2(a)(4). 
  2(a)(3) Did the company executive who chose to allow the plaintiff only 
eighteen months of termination benefits act at that time with knowledge that 
this decision discriminated against plaintiff on grounds of gender? 
_____YES  _____NO 
If YES to 2(a)(3), skip to 2(b).  Otherwise, answer 2(a)(4). 
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  2(a)(4) Did the company executive act at that time with reckless disregard 
for whether or not this decision discriminated against plaintiff on grounds of 
gender? 
_____YES  _____NO 
  2(b) Did the company executive who chose to allow the plaintiff only 
eighteen months of termination benefits act at the time in the scope of 
employment for the company or instead out of personal animosity and as a 
departure from acting as an executive of the company? 
_____(1) We find unanimously, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the 
executive acted within the scope of employment for the company. 
_____(2) We find unanimously, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the 
executive acted out of personal animosity and as a departure from acting as an 
executive for the company. 
_____(3) We unanimously find no preponderance of the evidence either way. 
 
A more extended exercise might address additional questions about 
whether more detailed instructions explaining one or more of the subparts of 
Question 2 should be requested by one or more of the attorneys, and used by 
the trial judge. 
In addition, such an extended exercise might address additional questions 
of law and fact that might be raised by different assumptions about when 
plaintiff’s employment with the company began.  When her employment was 
terminated, had she been employed as long as one or both of the male 
executives had been employed when they were laid off on December 31, 1998?  
Did the company have a benefits plan that spoke especially to this issue? 
I conclude this Essay without discussing these and other issues of fact and 
law that might be parts of a more extended exercise.  I do so in part because of 
its length, but also because of my hope that I have proceeded far enough to 
explain the usefulness of this kind of drafting exercise, and my hope that the 
citations I have provided will enable a teacher who wishes to press farther to 
have some help and encouragement to do so. 
 
